An investigation of the classifiers to detect android malicious apps by Sharma, Ashu & Sahay, Sanjay K.
An investigation of the classifiers to detect android
malicious apps
Ashu Sharma and Sanjay Kumar Sahay∗
Department of Computer Science and Information System, Birla Institute of Technology and
Science, K. K. Birla Goa Campus, NH-17B, By Pass Road, Zuarinagar-403726, Goa, India
{p2012011, ssahay}@goa.bits-pilani.ac.in
Abstract. Android devices are growing exponentially and are connected through
the internet accessing billion of online websites. The popularity of these devices
encourages malware developer to penetrate the market with malicious apps to an-
noy and disrupt the victim. Although, for the detection of malicious apps different
approaches are discussed. However, proposed approaches are not suffice to detect
the advanced malware to limit/prevent the damages. In this, very few approaches
are based on opcode occurrence to classify the malicious apps. Therefore, this
paper investigates the five classifiers using opcodes occurrence as the prominent
features for the detection of malicious apps. For the analysis, we use WEKA
tool and found that FT detection accuracy (∼79.27%) is best among the investi-
gated classifiers. However, true positives rate i.e. malware detection rate is high-
est (∼99.91%) by RF and fluctuate least with the different number of prominent
features compared to other studied classifiers. The analysis shows that overall
accuracy is majorly affected by the false positives of the classifier.
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1 Introduction
Android is one of the most popular operating system in for smart devices and are con-
nected through the internet accessing billions of online websites. The exponential in-
crease in android apps is basically due to the open source, third party distribution, free
rich SDK and the very much suited java language. In this growing android apps market,
it is very hard to know which apps are spam or malware content. As per statista [29]
∼ 2 × 106 android apps are available at google play store. Also, there are many third
party android apps available for the users [3], which may be malicious. Hence potential
of the malicious apps or malware entering these systems is now at never seen before
levels.
Due to ease of use, these devices hold sensitive information such as personal data,
browsing history, shopping history, financial details, etc. [1] i.e. users are ever more fre-
quent to use the internet consequently these devices are vulnerable to cyber threats/attacks.
In this, Quick Heal Threat Research Labs in the 3rd quarter of 2015 reported that they
have received samples of files at the rate of ∼ 4.2 × 105 samples per day for the An-
droid and Windows platforms and the G Data security experts expect a rapid increase
in numbers of new malware samples in 2016 compare to previous years [6].
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The traditional approach i.e. signature based techniques, to detect the advanced ma-
licious android apps are no longer effective, as it uses code obfuscation techniques.
However, a number of methods have been proposed on static and dynamic analysis for
analyzing and detecting Android malware prior to their installation [7] [8] [12] [19]
[33]. It appears that so far proposed approaches are not suffice to detect the advanced
malware to limit/prevent the damages [28]. Therefore, we investigated the five classi-
fiers ( FT, Random forest, J48, LMT and NBT ) and present a novel approach to combat
malware threat/attack by analysing the opcode occurrence in the apps. The remaining
paper is organised as follows. In next section, we discuss the related work. Section 3
describe our approach to detect the malicious apps based on static analysis. The results
of our approach are discussed in section 4. Finally, section 5 contains the conclusion
and direction for the future work.
2 Related work
Static and dynamic analysis are the two main approaches applied for detection of an-
droid malware [28]. In static analysis, without executing the apps, the code are analysed
to find a malicious pattern by extracting the features such as permissions, APIs used,
control flow, data flow, broadcast receivers, intents, hardware components etc. Whereas,
in the dynamic analysis the apps are examined in run time environment by monitoring
the dynamic behaviour (network connections, system calls, resources usage, etc.) of
the apps and the system response. However, in both the approaches selected classi-
fiers are trained with a known dataset to differentiate the benign and malicious apps. In
this Seo, et. al. by analysing the permissions, dangerous APIs and keywords associated
with malicious behaviours detected potential malicious scripts in Android apps [25]. A
lightweight framework was discussed by Arp, et. al., which uses AndroidManifest.xml
file and disassembled code to generate a joint vector space [4]. Wu, et. al., approach
detects the malware by analyzing AndroidManifest.xml and tracing the systems calls
[32]. Sanz, et. al., analysed five classifiers with machine learning (DT, KNN, BN, RF &
SVM) for automatic malware detection by analysing different sets of Android market
permissions, ratings and a number of ratings. They found that among five classifiers
BN performs the best while RF second and DT worst [22]. Vidas, et. al., developed a
tool which automatically analyzes the apps to find the least permissions/privileges that
are required to run the apps [30]. In this, Fuchs, et. al., method analyse the data flow
across the android apps components [9]. Daniel, et. al., did a broad static analysis by
embedding the features in a joint vector space, such that the typical patterns of mal-
ware can be automatically identified [4]. In the DREBIN project, a study has been done
with 123,453 benign and 5,560 malware apps. Based on a set of characteristics derived
from binary and metadata Gonzalez, et. al., proposed a method named as DroidKin,
which can detect the similarity among the apps under various levels of obfuscation
(code reordering, register reassignment, etc. [28] [27]) [11]. SVM-based malware de-
tection scheme given by Gugian, et. al., integrates both risky permission combinations
and vulnerable API calls and used them as features for the classification [24]. Sara-
cino, et. al., 2016 [23] proposed a novel host-based malware detection system called
MADAM which simultaneously analyzes and correlates the features at four levels (ker-
nel, application, user and package) to detect and stop the malicious behaviours. Quentin
et. al., uses op-code sequences to detect the malicious apps, however the approach will
not detect completely different malware [14]. Later on using N-opcode, BooJoong et.
al., classified the malware and reported F-measure 98% [15].
3 Our approach
A novel approach to classify the unknown android malware is shown in figure 1, which
involves finding the promising features (algorithm. 1), classifiers training and its detec-
tion.
Select testing dataData preprocessing
Feature selection
Supervised learning using 
WEKA
Classifiers
Results
Android malware apps from Drebin project Android benign apps from google play store
Selected features
Select training data
Fig. 1. Flow chart of the proposed approach for detection of android malicious apps.
3.1 Data Preprocessing and Feature Selection
For the classification of unknown android malware apps, we downloaded 5531 android
malware from DREBIN [4] and 2691 benign apps from google play store. The benign
apps are cross verified from virustotal.com [2].
To understand the logic of android malware apps, we use freely available apktool
[31] to decompress the android .apk files. After decompressing, we kept .smali files
and discarded other created files/folders. The .smali files contains only one class in-
formation and is equivalent to .class file. To find the prominent features for classifica-
tion of android malware and benign, we extracted the opcodes (list of the android op-
codes is available at http://pallergabor.uw.hu/androidblog/dalvik opcodes.html) of the
apps from the obtained .smali files. We analysed the opcode occurrence of all the an-
droid apps and found that the occurrence of many opcodes in malware and benign apps
differ in large. The normalized opcode occurrence of both the apps are shown in figure.
2. The mapping of the opcodes with hexadecimal representation has been kept same as
given by the android developers [18]. The prominent opcodes (features), which suppose
to distinguish the malicious and benign android apps are obtained as described in the
algorithm. 1. For the classification, we have used Waikato Environment for Knowledge
Analysis (WEKA) tool, a collection of visualisation tools and algorithms for data anal-
ysis and predictive modeling, together with graphical user interfaces for easy access to
this functionality [13], in which many inbuilt classifiers are available. On the basis of
studies done by Sharma and Sahay [26] [21], we selected the best classifier (Random
forest [20], LMT (Logistic model trees) [17], NBT (Naive-Bayes tree) [16], J48 [5]
and FT (Functional Tree) [10]) for in-depth analysis by using K-fold cross-validation
technique.
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Fig. 2. Dominant opcodes of malicious and benign android apps .
Algorithm 1 : Feature Selection
INPUT: Pre-processed data
NB: Number of benign android apps, NM: Number of malware android apps,
n: Total number of prominent features required.
OUTPUT: List of prominent features
BEGIN
for all benign apps do
Compute sum of the frequencies fi of each opcode Op and normalize it.
FB(Opj) = (
∑
fi(Opj))/NB
end for
for all malware data do
Compute sum of the frequencies fi of each opcode Op and normalize it.
FM (Opj) = (
∑
fi(Opj))/NM
end for
for all opcode Opj do
Find the difference of the normalized frequencies for each opcode D(Opj).
D(Opj) = |FB(Opj)− FM (Opj)|
end for
return n number of prominent opcodes as features with high D(Op).
4 Result analysis
The five selected classifiers are analysed by applying supervised machine learning tech-
nique with K-fold cross validation for k = 10. For the analysis, we first obtained the top
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Fig. 5. True positives obtained by selected five
classifiers with different number of prominent
features.
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Fig. 6. True negatives obtained by selected five
classifiers with different number of prominent
features.
200 promising features (algorithm 1). The accuracy of the classifiers is obtained by
varying the promising features and is measured by the equation
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FN + TN + FP
× 100 (1)
where,
TP −→ True positive, the number of malware apps correctly classified.
FN −→ False negative, the number of malware apps incorrectly classified.
Fig. 7. False negatives obtained by selected five
classifiers with different number of prominent
features.
Fig. 8. False positives obtained by selected five
classifiers with different number of prominent
features.
TN −→ True negative, the number of benign apps correctly classified.
FP −→ False positives, the number of benign apps incorrectly classified.
The performance of the classifier has been studied by taking 20% of available data
(not used for training) with 20-200 best features, incrementing 20 features at each step
and the result obtained are shown in figure. 3. From the analysis, the best accuracy is
obtained by FT, Random forest, J48, LMT and NBT is approximately 79.27, 74.95,
71.73, 70.51 and 68.87 percent (figure 4). Among these classifiers the least fluctuation
in the accuracy by varying the features is observed in Random forest. Figure 5 shows the
TPR (malware detection rate) of all five classifiers with a different number of features.
We found that the RF gives maximum TPR with least fluctuation compared to other
classifiers.
Figure 6 shows the TNR (benign detection rate) for all five classifiers with a dif-
ferent number of features. Here with some exception, we observed that FT detected
the benign better than the other classifiers with a different number of features. Figure
7 shows the false negatives of all selected classifier, in which compared to other clas-
sifiers the RF is good and also fluctuation is least with the number of features. Figure
8 shows the false positives of the analysed classifiers and here we observed that all the
five classifier does not give a good result, hence very much affects the final accuracy.
However, although the false negative of RF is not as par but the fluctuation with the
number of features is least compared to other classifiers.
5 Conclusion
The threat/attack from the malicious apps in android devices are now never seen at
before levels, as millions of android apps are available officially (google play store) and
unofficially. Some of these available apps may be malicious, hence these devices are
very much vulnerable to cyber threat/attack. The consequence will be devastating if in
time counter-measures are not developed. Therefore, in this paper, we investigated five
classifier FT, Random forest, J48, LMT and NBT for the detection of malicious apps.
We found that among the studied classifiers, FT is the best classifiers and detect the
malware with ∼ 79.27% accuracy. However, true positives i.e. malware detection rate
is highest (∼ 99.91%) by RF and fluctuate least with the different number of prominent
features compared to other studied classifiers, which is better than BooJoong et. al.,
F-measure (98%) [15]. The analysis shows that overall accuracy is majorly affected
by the false positives of the classifier. Hence in future more detail study are required
to decrease the false positive and negative ratio for overall good accuracy and in this
direction work is in progress, showing impressive results.
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